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Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson


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The concept of revolutionary terrorism

MARTHA CRENSHAW HUTCHINSON
Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia

A recent article by Sartori stresses the importance for comparative politics of the construction of basic concepts which are discriminatory and “classificatory,” enabling one to study “one thing at a time and different things at different times” (1970, p. 1040). Sartori emphasizes the need for precise conceptual connotation; only by making the definitional attributes of a concept more exact, rather than by increasing their number to extend the range of the concept, does one retain the possibility of empirically testing the concept. The article concludes that the most needed concepts are on a middle-level of abstraction, combining high explanatory power with precise descriptive content (p. 1052).

Although the contemporary importance of the phenomenon of insurgent terrorism in internal war is undeniable, a review of theoretical literature on the subject reveals the absence of a concept of terrorism, defined in accordance with Sartori’s requirements.

An early analysis using a historical-legalistic approach explains that the term “terrorism” is formed from the Latin word “terror,” which originally meant physical trembling and later came to include the emotional state of extreme fear (Waciorski, 1939, pp. 24-27). Terrorism thus means “system of terror” and was coined to condemn the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution (pp. 27-31). This paper will retain the original distinction between “terror” and “terrorism,” although many authors use the terms interchangeably. Waciorski mentions the definition of terrorism which, prompted by anarchist activities, the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and the Repression of Terrorism adopted in 1937: acts of terrorism are criminal acts directed against a state which aim, or are of a nature, to provoke terror (p. 71). In conclusion Waciorski proposes a different definition: “Terrorism is a method of action by which an agent tends to produce terror in order to impose his domination” (p. 98).

Proceeding chronologically the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences contains the next definition: “a term used to describe the method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence” (Hardman, 1948, p. 575).

Unfortunately most modern analyses of internal warfare, when they define “terror"
or "terrorism" at all, do not improve on the older attempts and often sacrifice clarity for brevity: "the attempt to govern or to oppose government by intimidation," "the threat or the use of violence for political ends" (Thayer, 1965, p. 116; Crozier, 1960, p. 159), "a peculiar and violent type of political struggle" (Pye, 1956, p. 102), or something used against people, not things (Knorr, 1962, p. 56). Only one student of internal war considers terrorism in detail and defines it in a manner which constitutes a basis for further development: "a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence" (Thornton, 1964, p. 73).

Outside the scope of studies devoted to internal war, there is an interesting definition in Walter's (1969) analysis of "regimes of terror" or the governmental use of terrorism. Walter, as does Thornton, points out that insurgent and governmental terrorism are basically similar phenomena and that the same type of concept could define both (Thornton, 1964, pp. 72-73). Walter describes a "process of terror" which involves three elements: (1) an act or threat of violence, which (2) causes an emotional reaction, and (3) produces social effects. A similarly structured "siege of terror" is the attempt to destroy an authority system by creating extreme fear through systematic violence (Walter, 1969, pp. 6-7).

None of these authors clearly states the essential attributes of the concept of terrorism. They do not distinguish between the qualities data may have and properties they must have in order to be classified under the concept of terrorism. From the comparative study of these definitional efforts and from the investigation of a particular case of what all observers agree to be "terrorism" in the activity of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian Revolution, 1954-62, this paper proposes an alternative definition of the concept, intended to be an improved "data-container" and a more useful guideline for interpretation and observation (Sartori, 1970, pp. 1039-40).

This analysis is pertinent only to revolutionary terrorism; thus the concept here defined is not necessarily applicable to the use of violence by governments to maintain control or to implement policies. Revolutionary terrorism is a part of insurgent strategy in the context of internal warfare or revolution: the attempt to seize political power from the established regime of a state, if successful causing fundamental political and social change. Violence is not revolution's unique instrument, but it is almost always a principal one. Such internal war is often of long duration and high intensity of violence.

Certain essential elements of the definition of terrorism are thus situational constants. It is a method or system used by a revolutionary organization for specific political purposes. Therefore neither one isolated act nor a series of random acts is terrorism.

The form of the individual acts which make up the terrorist strategy is violent; they are acts of emotionally or physically "destructive harm" (Walter, 1969, p. 8). Terrorism differs from other instruments of violence in its "extranormality": it "lies beyond the norms of violent political agitation that are accepted by a given society," states Thornton (1964, p. 76). In this

1. Dallin and Breslauer's (1970) study of Communist regimes' use of "terror" is too restricted in scope to be useful for this paper, although it is an excellent work on the functions of governmental terrorism.

2. This concept of revolution would include for example Tanter and Midlarsky's "mass revolution" and "revolutionary coup" (1967, p. 265); Rosenau's "authority wars" and "structural wars" (1964, pp. 63-64); Eckstein's "political" and "social" revolutions and "wars of independence" (1965, p. 136); and the theories of Johnson (1966) and Arendt (1965).
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writer's opinion terrorism is socially as well as politically unacceptable, as the following description of the ways in which acts of terrorism may be extraordinary should demonstrate. Acts of terrorism are often particularly atrocious and psychologically shocking, such as throat-cutting or physical mutilation of victims. It usually occurs within the civilian population; both the victims and the scene of violence are unaccustomed to it and it occurs unexpectedly. The act is not only unpredictable but often anonymous. This arbitrariness of terrorist violence makes it unacceptable and abnormal.

Many definitions of terrorism refer to the use or the threat of violence (Thornton, 1964, pp. 2-3). Actually the single act of terrorism with its context is a combination of use and threat; the act implies a threat. There may be written or verbal threats as well, but the violent act is essential. This duality of the act of terrorism issues from the fact that the revolutionaries select for attack objects which are not obstacles to be eliminated, but symbols of certain groups or forces in the state. Since the victims are examples of the groups they represent, the act of terrorism is a threat to the other members. If the target is nonhuman, the act must convey the message “you may be next” to a particular group. This is one of the reasons for terrorism’s apparent irrationality: the person attacked is usually not personally dangerous or offensive to the revolution. A consistent pattern exists of choosing victims among groups whose political behavior or attitudes are important to the outcome of the conflict.

The insurgents deliberately intend to create a psychological effect through these acts. This effect may range from terror or extreme fear in direct target groups (among whom there are victims) to curiosity, sympathy, or admiration in groups not directly threatened. This emotional response is intended in turn to influence political behavior and attitudes in order to further the revolution’s chances of success. The most important target group is therefore the mass of the civilian population among whom there will be the most victims.

Summarizing the basic components of a definition of the concept of terrorism produces the following list of essential properties which empirical examination of data must reveal:

1. Terrorism is part of a revolutionary strategy—a method used by insurgents to seize political power from an existing government.
2. Terrorism is manifested in acts of socially and politically unacceptable violence.
3. There is a consistent pattern of symbolic or representative selection of the victims or objects of acts of terrorism.
4. The revolutionary movement deliberately intends these actions to create a psychological effect on specific groups and thereby to change their political behavior and attitudes.

This definition may be empirically tested against the activity of the FLN in Algeria. Terrorism was an important element of the FLN’s eight-year struggle against French rule. Although resistance to French authority even in the form of armed bandits attacking the French military was relatively normal and considered perfectly honorable in many areas, FLN terrorism was definitely extranormal. Primitive societies, which most of Algeria was, are commonly accustomed to much cruelty, but throat-cutting, a frequent

3. Thornton’s discussion of the symbolic nature of terrorism which distinguishes it from sabotage and assassination is valuable (1964, pp. 77-78).

4. A “direct target group” is the same as Thornton’s “identification group” (1964, p. 79). The significant distinction between direct and indirect targets is the reason for the different terminology here.
FLN method, was used only in animal sacrifices. The FLN also cut off victims' noses, the nose being regarded as a symbol of honor and dignity in Algerian society (Châir, 1971, p. 59). Normal tribal violence in rural Algeria, particularly in the Berber regions, was highly ritualized, symbolic, strictly regulated by custom, and involved little bloodshed (Bourdieu, 1965, pp. 201-03). Sometimes a murderer could atone for his crime by paying a fine to the victim's relatives. In urban areas the FLN tended to explode bombs or grenades in crowds; the unusualness of such violence needs no further explanation.

The individual victims of FLN terrorism were most often members of identifiable politically relevant groups: for example the European minority, Moslem local or tribal authorities, Moslem elected or nonelected officials in the French administration, Moslems who disobeyed FLN orders on a variety of subjects, policemen, French administrators, Moslems who cooperated socially, politically, or economically with the French, and French military officers responsible for dealing with Moslems. On some occasions the FLN attacked farms, animals, or economic installations as psychological threats. It is not possible to prove FLN intent in each individual act of terrorism. While it is logical that when the FLN chose Moslem municipal officials as victims, the subsequent large number of resignations of these officials was a deliberate aim, specific evidence may be lacking. However enough data do exist to indicate that in general acts of terrorism were part of a calculated strategy. The FLN often issued warning tracts or left explanatory messages on the bodies of their victims. According to the FLN the only victims of their violence were "traitors" or "enemies," but their definition of these categories was highly flexible. The FLN journal, El Moudjahid, sometimes explained the revolutionary motivations. An article once boasted that the action of FLN fidayine had caused panic, insecurity, disarray, disorientation, bouleversement, and fear in the enemy camp ("Le FIDAI," 1957, p. 3). Another time the FLN claimed that their activities in metropolitan France against police and economic objectives created an "incontestable psychological shock" and enumerated the specific political effects thereby gained ("Second Front," 1958, p. 9). Other than such primary sources, Courrière's (1968, 1969, 1970, 1971) four-volume history of the Algerian war is an invaluable account of the FLN's internal deliberations. Demonstration of intent is thus not of overwhelming difficulty in this case.

The concept of terrorism defined in this paper not only identifies cases of terrorism, it also aids in explaining the empirical and theoretical significance. The reason for the frequency of revolutionary terrorism is that it is an effective strategy; its benefits outweigh its costs.

The revolutionary movement's decision to use terrorism should be considered as a choice among violent means, not between after warning is unpredictable. One increased his vulnerability by disobeying FLN directions, but did not make an attack inevitable.

It is interesting to note that, faithful to its origins, terrorism is still a term of opprobrium. The FLN insisted that they were not "terrorists" but fidayine, militants engaged in liberating combat, "enlightened heroes": "The 'terrorist' when he accepts a mission lets death enter his soul. . . . The fidaï has a rendez-vous with the life of the Revolution and with his own life." Moreover "it is because he is not a terrorist that the fidaï cannot be terrorized by . . . General Massu," who headed French antiterrorist efforts in Algiers ("Le FIDAI," 1957, p. 3).
violence and nonviolence, because peaceful means of political protest are usually denied by the regime. An FLN leader explained, "Urban terrorism like guerrilla warfare is the only method of expression of a crushed people" (Ouzegane, 1962, p. 257). But the cost of terrorism is much lower than the expense of forming, arming, and supplying guerrilla bands. Insurgent material weakness may thus make terrorism the only alternative. A terrorist organization whether urban or rural requires few militants who need little training, no uniforms, no special equipment, no logistical support, and who do not even require individual weapons. The same firearm may be used for several operations (Massu, 1971, p. 120). In fact knives suffice. Bombs are relatively easily produced. A terrorist can support himself financially, since he does not have to leave civilian life to join the maquis. Individuals not groups usually perform acts of terrorism, although a support organization is necessary. The basic requirements for terrorism are secrecy, discipline, and thorough organization, none of which requires heavy financial investment.

The attractiveness of terrorism to insurgents who lack means is the reason it is often called the "weapon of the weak" and many strategic models of insurrection situate it as the first phase in the conflict, followed respectively by guerrilla and then conventional warfare as the insurgents grow stronger (Crozier, 1960, pp. 127-29, 159; Paret, 1964, pp. 12-15; and McCuen, 1966, pp. 30-40). Such schemes can be unnecessarily rigid in assigning terrorism to the outbreak of the insurrection. Although the FLN used terrorism early in the Algerian war, its later use although perhaps illustrative of military weakness did not signify impending defeat. Physical weakness does not always imply political weakness, and the single-cause interpretation of terrorism is gravely misleading. Thornton's is the most flexible model: the insurrection is a continuum with terrorism, guerrilla activity, and conventional warfare respectively taking precedence at each stage. The last phase of warfare is then a mixture of all three forms (1964, pp. 92-93).

Terrorism's value to revolutionary movements is not proportional to its expense, but to its psychological effectiveness. The most extreme but not the only reaction to acts of terrorism is emotional terror. Psychologists commonly define the psychological condition of terror as extreme fear or anxiety. Following Freud they conceive of normal fear as rational appreciation of a real danger, whereas anxiety is abnormal fear, an irrational response to a vaguely perceived unfamiliar menace (Fromm-Reichmann, 1960, p. 130; Riezler, 1950, pp. 131-32; and Janis, 1962, p. 59). Acts of terrorism are an original type of menace. Terrorism poses a real not imaginary danger, and thus it is hardly fair to label the fear it causes "abnormal." Nor is such fear necessarily irrational. However the reaction to the terrorist menace tends to be anxiety because the stimulus although real is vague, incomprehensible, and totally unexpected: the qualities of the anxiety-producing situation. Persons confronted with terrorism feel helpless, which contributes to their anxiety, but this feeling is usually based on actual impotence. Terrorism appears irrational to the threatened individual, who therefore cannot respond rationally. The members of direct target groups (and perhaps indirect targets, if they feel some affinity with the direct target) feel vulnerable, and investigation of people who experienced air raids during World War II shows that one of the most important causes of anxiety is a feeling of extreme helpless-

7. Thornton states that "the insurgent must attempt to communicate effectively to his audience the idea that terror is the only weapon appropriate to the situation" (1964, p. 76), but he fails to explain why this is true. This statement does not hold for all FLN terrorism.
ness and the consequent breakdown of the sentiment of personal invulnerability. When an individual feels that he has barely escaped serious danger, his psychological defenses are shattered and he feels future threats more acutely (Janis, 1951, pp. 23-24, 173-74). Furthermore studies of concentration camp prisoners reveal that the unpredictability of danger in such an environment is the most psychologically damaging factor (Bettelheim, 1960; Bluhm, 1964, p. 201; Kogon, 1964, p. 198; Lowenthal, 1946, pp. 3-5).

Terrorism affects the social structure as well as the individual; it upsets the framework of precepts and images which members of society depend on and trust. Since one no longer knows what sort of behavior to expect from other members of society, the system is disoriented. The formerly coherent community dissolves into a mass of anomic individuals, each concerned only with personal survival. “The sine qua non of a society . . . is the possession of mutual expectations by members of society, allowing them to orient their behavior to each other” (Johnson, 1966, p. 8). Terrorism destroys the solidarity, cooperation, and interdependence on which social functioning is based, and substitutes insecurity and distrust.

The following excerpts from the personal diary of Feraoun, an Algerian novelist and schoolteacher who lived in Fort National, Kabylia, eloquently express the consequences of terrorism.

Again a market day. . . . Toward noon I made a rapid tour of the town. People seem brittle, ready for any madness, any anger, any stupidity. I felt through the crowd an impression of horror, as though I were living in the midst of a nightmare. An undefinable curse reigns over us. I found myself in the center of the hell of the damned, on which the bright Algerian sun shone. I hurried home, shaken. I do not know where this comes from, this is the first time I feel such suffering. Perhaps it is that, fear, the panicky fear without a precise object, without foundation [1962, p. 97].

My [French] colleagues are truly mad, they are pitiable and I would like to reassure them. But when one believes himself persecuted, he accepts only menace, he understands only danger, he imagines only scenes of carnage, he thinks only of death [p. 109].

At each execution of a traitor or pretended such [by the FLN], anguish takes over the survivors. No one is sure of anything, it is truly terror. . . . Terror which rules mysterious and unexplainable. Nerves are on edge [p. 170].

Each of us is guilty just because he belongs to such a category, such a race, such a people. You fear that they will make you pay with your life for your place in the world or the color of your skin, you are afraid of being attacked uniquely because nobody has attacked you yet; you wonder why you don’t do anything when you are almost sure of not being able to do anything—even sincerely mourn the victims, mourn them totally in the shadow of that secret and inadmissible joy which is that of the escapee [p. 160].

Soustelle, Governor General of Algeria in 1955, described the social effects of terrorism in some areas: rather than stimulating cooperation among the threatened, it led to division and strife (1956, p. 121). Shops were closed and people were afraid to leave their homes; Soustelle feared a total collapse of economic life and social structure (pp. 123-24).

The success of terrorism in producing fear or terror is not absolute, and if it causes fear in the immediate, political action may not result from it. Terrorism may produce a
psychological tolerance, a numbed passivity on the part of the target, which is often a precursor of hostility. This anger may eventually erupt into overt aggression against the insurgents. In some cases the revolutionary movement may intend to create a mixture of fear and hostility, for example in an unpopular minority. But if terrorism should lead to passive bewilderment or anti-insurgent aggression from the mass population, the revolutionary cause would suffer seriously.

The tolerance of violence seems to be influenced by two factors. The first is the duration and magnitude of the terrorist threat. Sustained intense relentless terrorism is more likely to numb the target than is sporadic terrorism ("Document on Terror," 1952, pp. 44-57; Meerloo, 1960, pp. 512-13; and Janis, 1951, pp. 117-18). This finding corroborates the conclusion that terrorism’s psychological effectiveness is based to a large degree on its unpredictability. Revolutionary movements usually lack the power to carry out sustained terrorism except in limited areas, but there they do risk the overuse of violence. Feraoun referring to Kabylia in 1956-57 comments:

For many, all these murders finish by losing their former significance. One wonders, in effect, if all those who fall are traitors. Little by little, doubt and lassitude invade consciences; despair gives way to anger. If this continues each one will accuse himself of treason and all the traitors, reunited, will revolt against the killers, who will expire cruelly in their turn [1962, p. 203].

Minor rebellions against the FLN did occur occasionally, usually in the form of supporting French self-defense programs.

The second factor in the use of terrorism which affects the popular reaction is a communication problem. There is some indication that if the revolutionary movement provides positive recommendations to its targets on how to relieve the condition of stress caused by terrorism, there is less danger of inaction (Leventhal, 1965). In Kabylia and in many other areas the FLN issued puritanical and unreasonably excessive negative orders: the populations were forbidden to consult doctors, lawyers, midwives, pharmacists, to smoke, drink alcohol, or to amuse themselves, or to cooperate with Europeans in any fashion. These orders, in addition to private vengeances carried out under the guise of FLN directives, made the FLN unpopular with the populations under its control. But even complying with revolutionary demands does not provide complete relief, for there is no immunity. There is a boundary line in terrorism between too much clarification and too much obscurity; overstepping the line in the first direction makes terrorism lose its unpredictability and thus its power to terrify. Going too far in the second direction may cause the target to revolt.

Hostility inspired by terrorism may not always lead to behavioral aggression against the insurgents. Psychological theories now consider hostility and aggression as reactions to frustration (Gurr, 1968, pp. 247-51; Berkowitz, 1962). Revolutionary terrorism and the fear it may cause are frustrating situations, but the resulting hostility may be “displaced”:

Frustrated people often aggress against those they blame for their unpleasant experiences, but they do not always blame those who actually are most contiguous with those events [Berkowitz, 1962, p. 118].

Frustrated individuals and outside observers do not necessarily perceive the same “frustrating agent;” therefore attribution of blame may be irrational (Berkowitz, 1962, p. 119). People often transfer their aggression to an available and acceptable object
whom they consider less likely to punish (p. 130). It is significant in this respect that the Janis air war studies reveal that citizens blamed their own governments for not protecting them against raids, rather than the countries actually responsible for the bombings (Berkowitz, 1962, pp. 42-43).

Revolutionary propaganda can increase the regime's attractiveness as an object for popular aggression. The FLN usually found this persuasion task simplified by the division in Algerian social and political life between the dominant European minority and the estranged Moslem mass of the population. French counterinsurgency methods also helped them. By bidding for Moslem support as the champions of nationalism and independence and by constantly vilifying the French, the FLN increased the likelihood of the phenomenon of displacement of aggression. It is also probable that the Moslem population feared FLN violence more than they did French, since they were virtually unprotected against terrorism which they dreaded more.

If terrorism arouses anger or aggressive behavior, the revolutionaries, if they consider this a drawback, can deny guilt in the matter. In revolutionary situations it is difficult to establish facts; opinion is usually so polarized—a condition which terrorism helps to create—that most people believe only the arguments of the side with whom they are ideologically sympathetic. Hence vehement denial may substitute for proof. The FLN used this tactic on several occasions, of which the most spectacular was the Melouza massacre in 1957. The FLN ordered the execution of all male inhabitants of a village, Melouza, which had rebelled against FLN terrorism, supported a rival nationalist movement and also cooperated with the French army. When the gruesome details of the massacre became known, even the FLN's customary supporters abroad joined in the universal condemnation. The FLN then denied their responsibility and accused the French of staging the incident in order to discredit the FLN; they lent credibility to this thesis and gained international publicity by sending telegrams pleading innocence to world leaders and calling for a United Nations investigation. Although outside of Algeria most people accepted the French version, in Algeria most Moslems believed the FLN, mainly because the French did not have a reputation for honesty in Algeria.

One student of internal warfare argues that although terrorism may cause immediate behavioral change, it is not advisable for insurgents because it does not result in wholehearted long-run ideological support: “support given under coercion is unlikely to develop into a more enduring allegiance unless it can be systematically maintained over a long period” (Gurr, 1970, p. 213). Leites and Wolf disagree with the “hearts-and-minds” approach to revolution: “the only ‘act’ R [rebellion] needs desperately from a large proportion of the populace is nondenunciation (that is, eschewing the act of informing against R) and noncombat against it” (1970, p. 10). Fear, lack of enthusiasm for the authorities, “commercial” motives that calculate the possibilities of reward, all are as powerful in prompting popular support for the insurgents as is sympathy or conviction (pp. 10-13). And since the active supporters of the revolution are always a small minority, little active mass support is required. Leites and Wolf conclude that it is popular behavior, not attitudes, which counts: “thorough organization and effective coercion can enjoin or engender particular modes of behavior by the population, notwithstanding popular preferences that would lead to different behavior if a purely voluntary choice could be made” (p. 149).

The Algerian case falls somewhere be-
tween these two positions. Certainly ideological preferences are not the only motives which prompt popular behavior, but it is difficult to conceive of a revolutionary minority coercing a determinedly opposed population. There must be a combination of ideological affinity, realistic calculations of the insurgents' chances, and coercion.

Terrorism is a form of coercion which influences behavior, but it affects attitudes as well. It causes a polarization of opinion; confronted with terrorism, which affects the population as individuals not as a group, it is impossible to be neutral or uninvolved:

It is fair...to say that the very violence of terrorism has made no small number among us leave our ease and our laziness in order to reflect. Each one has been obliged to bend over the problem, to make an examination of his conscience, to tremble for his skin because the skin of the Kabyle is not worth much in the eyes of the terrorist [Feraoun, 1962, p. 47].

Terrorism also affects the attitudes of indirect targets. When the direct target is an unpopular minority, attacks on them may arouse admiration and respect for the insurgents among the general population. In Algeria many Moslems approved of FLN terrorism when Europeans were the victims, and many considered the FLN terrorists in Algiers (the center of anti-European terrorism), as heroes of the revolution (de Gramont, 1962, p. 1; Tillion, 1960, pp. 176-77). In fact indignation caused by the French execution of FLN prisoners forced the Algiers FLN to avenge the Moslem population by bombing Europeans; the FLN was “obliged (to manifest their presence and their community of sentiment with the mass of the people) to mark their reaction by an act” (Tillion, 1960, pp. 49-50). It was cruelly ironic that the leader of the Algiers FLN, convinced that the Melouza killings were the work of the French, ordered acts of terrorism in retaliation (Lebjaoui, 1970, p. 242; Massu, 1971, p. 306).

Tillion described the cycle of violence and counterviolence which terrorism, with its simultaneous and complicated psychological consequences, sets into motion. The Europeans of Algiers, maddened by FLN terrorism and under the pressure of fear and horror, called for repression against the Moslem population as an antiterrorist measure and refused any political reforms. Governmental action against Moslems—the arrests, the torture, the executions—directly contributed to the growth of terrorism. Moslems, who almost unanimously regarded the condemned prisoners as national heroes, became violently aggressive and desperate each time there was an execution. The FLN then reacted with acts of terrorism, appeasing the Moslems and infuriating the Europeans. Tillion accused both sides of trying to outbid the other in violence (1960, pp. 52-53).

The importance of the governmental response to terrorism cannot be underestimated. If the insurgent organization is weak, official repression may destroy it when terrorism demonstrates its existence, and terrorism is likely to incite more severe measures than other forms of less spectacular violence. In Algeria the French destroyed much of the FLN organization immediately after the opening of the revolution on November 1, 1954, but they were unable to halt guerrilla activity and clandestine terrorism against Moslems in inaccessible areas. If, as the accounts of terrorism in Algiers indicate, the revolutionary movement survives the regime's reaction, repression is likely to further revolutionary goals by alienating the civilian population from the government, and in the Algerian case from the Europeans. From any viewpoint an
efficient response to terrorism is difficult. Protection of the population or isolation of the guilty are hopeless tasks when the terrorists are indistinguishable from the mass, which happens when the population is either afraid or unwilling to inform on the insurgents. Without intelligence the government cannot make the crucial distinction. Hence to the government the entire population is suspect and all are guilty at least of complicity with the enemy. However strongly tempted by circumstances, the regime should avoid antiterrorist measures which are illegal and indiscriminate. Policies such as interning suspects without trial, widely practiced during the Algerian war, create popular sympathy for the insurgents; if interned suspects are not members of the revolutionary movement at the time of their seizure, they are likely to be on their release. Repression is also self-defeating because it increases insecurity and disorder, thereby contradicting the government's most basic function. If terrorism is successful, it is a symptom of disease in the body politic. It may mean that dissidents are given no opportunities for peaceful protest or that the population is dissatisfied with the regime. The causes of terrorism are political, but the response to it is usually based on military force.

The regime's response to terrorism is to some degree predictable, through consideration of the history of its reactions to crises. The French in Algeria had always answered with force Moslem expressions of political opinion which did not accord with French policy. The FLN risked provoking another severe repression, such as that near Sétif in 1945, when Moslem anti-European riots led to a French retaliation which left at least 15,000 Moslems dead. But it was unlikely that in 1954 the Fourth Republic burdened with the Indochina defeat, the problems of the European Defense Community, and na-
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serves this disalienating effect. On the contrary, everything leads one to think that violence, suffered or performed, contains a part, more or less large, of traumatization. This traumatization...can then only result in a repetition of the violent act...One could point to Frenchmen, having suffered German violence, echoing it in Indochina and from there into Algeria. It has also been said that the first terrorists of 1954 were the sons of those shot in 1945 [at Sétif]. In turn what will become of the children of these terrorists [Ivernel, 1962, pp. 392-93]?

Ouzegane does not support this view: "One must differentiate between 'violence which liberates and violence which oppresses'" (1962, p. 257).

Although Ivernel correctly assumed that the events at Sétif greatly influenced the 1954 movement, his traumatization theory is seriously challenged by the fact that many Frenchmen who suffered from the Germans were sensitized by their experience and many (Tillion being a notable example) attempted to halt the violence from both sides in Algeria. 8

There are other studies that dispute Fanon's position that violence is excellent psychological therapy. Janis and Katz (1959) for example note three "corrupting effects" of the use of violence: guilt, the weakening of internal superego controls, and "contagion effects," or unrestrained imitation. Violence with use becomes more frequent, extreme, and uncontrollable (pp. 91-93). Another view corroborates Fanon's conclusions but not his logic: despite the revolution's moral sanctioning of violence, its use causes guilt which encourages future violence by binding the anxiously guilty followers to their leaders (Neumann, 1960, pp. 288-89).

Revolutionary leaders usually treat the moral problem of terrorism as one in which the ends justify the means. They excuse terrorism as a last resort in an attempt to express political opinion and blame the regime for forcing them to take such desperate measures. "It's our only way of expressing ourselves," explained Saadi Yacef, head of the Algiers terrorist organization (Tillion, 1960, p. 47). These justifications do not appear to exorcise all guilt; Yacef disguised himself as a woman to inspect the results of a bombing he had ordered and was deeply moved when he discovered the body of a personal friend, a European. He wept when Tillion reminded him of the deaths for which he was responsible and when she called him an assassin (Tillion, 1960, and personal communication with the author; Yacef, 1962). A female member of the bomb network was mentally unbalanced by having performed acts of terrorism (Tillion, personal communication; Massu, 1971, pp. 183-90). A bomb-maker, Taleb, also had moral qualms and insisted that his bombs be used only on material targets (Massu, 1971, p. 182). However another less sensitive terrorist claimed that the role of the terrorist was no different from that of the technician or the ordinary soldier (Drif, 1960). It is true that terrorism is often a strictly disciplined form of violence.

One can only conclude that emotional guilt caused by terrorism is a purely personal matter. The majority of FLN terrorists did not feel so guilty that they refused to commit acts of terrorism. There can be no general rules, and there is no evidence to indicate that the internal effects of terrorism have long-term consequences on either the

8. General Massu in fact complained that the government allowed too many such sensitive officials to remain in positions of responsibility in Algeria. He claimed that they seriously impaired the efficiency of the army and the police (1971, pp. 30, 151-52).
individual or the society of which he forms a part.

Summing up, terrorism's attractiveness and significance for revolutionary organizations are due to the combination of economy, facility, and high psychological and political effectiveness. From the insurgent viewpoint there are certain foreseeable risks in employing a terrorist strategy: (1) the danger of creating hostility rather than fear in the civilian masses; (2) the possibility that the governmental response may destroy the revolutionary organization; and (3) the risk that the use of terrorism may emotionally harm the terrorists themselves. Of these three potential obstacles to terrorism's efficiency, the first is subject to the influence of propaganda and ideology and is thus partially a communication factor. Because of this risk of psychological backfiring, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a minority using terrorism could impose a solution on a majority unless this policy were acceptable to that majority. If the minority possesses overwhelming force, this might be possible, but a revolutionary minority does not have such means at its disposal. The second factor, the government's response, is external to the revolutionary organization, but it is predictable that if the revolution is seriously trying to obtain some degree of popular sympathy, regime repression will work in its favor. The insurgents can ignore the third problem, since arguments for and against violence cancel each other out. Here also communications which justify terrorism on moral grounds may modify its psychological effects. One may conclude that the effectiveness of terrorism is increased by nonviolent persuasion. Paradoxically terrorism, which must appear irrational and unpredictable in order to be effective, is an eminently rational strategy, calculated in terms of predictable costs and benefits.

This concept of revolutionary terrorism is sufficiently general to permit useful comparative analysis of several cases, but it is applicable only to specific circumstances: violent and lengthy conflict between a revolutionary organization and an incumbent regime over the future power distribution in the state. Terrorism is a deliberate revolutionary strategy in this context, and consequently it is not found in coups d'état which are rapid and relatively bloodless or in anarchic rebellions or riots. Nor do these propositions about terrorism necessarily apply to the governmental use of violence, although this use may be revolutionary.

Terrorism occurs under these conditions when it appears functional to the insurgents; they decide to employ terrorism because it seems to be the appropriate means to achieve certain ends, such as general insecurity and disorientation in the state, control of the civilian population, demoralization of the adversary, or publicity. Terrorism is particularly attractive when alternative means of reaching revolutionary goals are absent. Thus terrorism is, as revolutionary propaganda often proclaims, a measure of desperation and is likely to occur in a state where political expression is denied to opponents of the regime. That is not to say that revolutionary perceptions may not be false; in reality terrorism may be dysfunctional to the revolution or it may occur in nonrepressive states. Furthermore once a terrorist strategy is under way, it gains a momentum of its own, and insurgents may find themselves trapped in a cycle of terrorism and repression, unable to abandon terrorism because of militant and popular pressures.

One of the general conditions for the success of a terrorist strategy is obviously the accuracy of insurgent calculations. If insurgent perception of the situation and estimate of the psychological and political responses of selected targets to particular
acts are correct and technical efficiency is high, then terrorism is likely to succeed. Governmental response however is an opposing variable and may cause the failure of terrorism. The balance of these two factors determines the outcome, which is judged by the degree of discrepancy between insurgent intentions and actual consequences. It is more difficult to estimate the effectiveness of terrorism as compared to other violent or nonviolent revolutionary methods, such as guerrilla warfare, strikes, boycotts, or propaganda. In cases of successful revolution, as Algeria, one may ask whether or not the insurgents would have won without terrorism, but cases where terrorism succeeded but the revolution failed, or vice versa, present definite problems.

As far as the applicability of the concept to specific phenomena, this paper can only indicate some empirical examples which fit the theoretical propositions. This list is tentative and is only meant as a guide to broader inquiry into the subject, not as a definitive statement. The historical precursor of modern terrorism is the Russian terrorism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Irish revolutionaries employed terrorism, as did partisan and resistance movements during World War II, notably in Poland, Yugoslavia, and France. Since the Second World War however the number of internal wars accompanied by terrorism has increased sharply. One can cite the Philippines, Cyprus, Malaya, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Vietnam, Latin America, and most recently Northern Ireland. These cases offer a broad historical and geographical scope for comparison and testing of the validity of the concept.

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